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Whenever an unquoted company is to be valued the determination of cost of capital is
performed by using observable betas of comparable peer group companies. However, these
betas have to be adjusted for differing degrees of leverage. This so-called unlevering and
relevering belongs to the standard repertoire of modern finance theory, but so far, the effect
of divergent tax rates between the company being valued and the peer group has never
been adressed in context of unlevering und relevering beta. We abstain from the implicit
assumption of unique tax rates by deriving an adjustment formula for beta that takes into
account not only divergent leverage ratios but also divergent tax rates. Moreover, in an
numerical analysis we quantify the mispricings that result from a disregard of divergent
tax rates and show that these distortions can be of significant extent.
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1 Problem
When determining costs of capital, e.g. in context of corporate valuations, one usually
applies the (Tax) Capital Asset Pricing Model which states that costs of capital are com-
posed of the risk-free rate and a risk premium which itself equals the market premium
times beta. In case of a company that is publicly listed on a stock exchange beta can easily
be measuring by using historical stock prices. If, however, the company is not quoted the
determination of beta is based on the identification of an appropriate peer group consisting
of comparable companies whose betas can be derived from the capital market. In order to
apply these betas for the company which is to be valued two requirements are mentioned
in literature that have to be fulfilled:1
1. Identical operating/industry risk
2. Identical leverage risk
In order to meet the first requirement, one has to choose a peer group that resembles the
(non-listed) company with respect to its operating figures like size and industrial sector.2
The second condition has to be considered if peer group companies show differing debt
ratios and are therefore subject to a differing degree of financial risk. In this case the peer
group beta has to be adjusted properly for leverage effects before applying it to the com-





is conducted with the help of adjustment formulas which provide a mathematical relation
between beta of an unlevered firm and beta of a levered company. Such adjustment for-
mulas belong to the standard repertoire of modern finance theory and have been discussed
extensively in literature.3
However, very scant attention has been payed to the underlying tax regime when iden-
tifying the peer group and adjusting its beta for leverage effects. To the best of our
knowledge the question of how to deal with divergent tax systems imposed on the peer
group and the company that shall be valued has not been addressed in literature. That is
surprising, especially in light of the growing internationalization of capital markets and in
1See e.g. Damodaran (1999), p. 25 and Hillier/Ross/Westerfield/Jaffe/Jordan (2010), pp. 324–327.
2See Alford (1992), p. 106.
3See e.g. Hamada (1972), Harris and Pringle (1985), Ruback (2002), Modigliani and Miller (1963),
Damodaran (1994), p. 31 and 277. The adjustment formulas are based on different assumptions
concerning the consideration of default risk and the underlying financing policy. An overview is provided
by Fernandez (2008).
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context of the valuation of companies operating in niche industries for which appropriate
peer group companies can only be found abroad. In this article we address this question
by considering divergent corporate tax rates. Whenever the peer group and the enterprise
being valued are not only subject to different debt ratios but also to different tax rates one
has to adjust for leverage and tax effects.4 This article analyzes the influence of these tax
effects on the adjusted beta and thus on the costs of capital and firm value. We show that
a disregarding of divergent tax rates can lead to mispricings of non-negligible extent.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the derivation of an adjustment
formula that accounts for divergent debt ratios and divergent tax rates. Section 3 focuses
on a numerical analysis in order to quantify misevaluations which arise whenever untaxing
and retaxing are not taken into account. The article closes with a summary.
2 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 Assumptions
For simplicity reasons we consider a peer group consisting of only one company which is,
just like the company being valued, assumed to be free of default risk.5 From this it follows
that the risk-free rate rf can be applied for costs of debt, and debt beta has a zero value,
βD = 0.
Under these assumptions and for a financing strategy based on market values6 with









is widely used.7 It provides a connection between beta of a levered company βl and beta
of an unlevered firm βu, both facing an identical corporate tax rate τ . This formula will be
the starting point for our considerations. However, in contrast to equation (1) we assume
that the peer group company is subject to a tax rate amounting to τp, whereas (e.g. due









5Our results remain valid if even risky debt and several peer group companies are considered. However,
these extensions will cause problems (like the assignment of correct weights for each member within
the peer group) that we want to rule out.
6This financing policy implies deterministic future debt ratios measured in market values.
7See Miles and Ezzell (1980). For application conditions, the derivation and advantages over the
Modigliani-Miller adjustment formula and its variants, see Kruschwitz/Lo¨ﬄer (2006), pp. 71–75.
Prof. Dr.Daniela Lorenz, Dr. Christian Sielaff, Int. J. Eco. Res., 2012v3i5, 92-100 ISSN: 2229-6158
IJER | Sep - Oct 2012  
Available online@www.ijeronline.com
 93
International Journal of Economics and Research, 2012v3i5, 92–100 ISSN: 2229-6158
to international tax differentials) a different tax rate τc is relevant for the company being
valued.
2.2 Adjustment formula with divergent tax rates
In order to determine the unobservable beta of the (levered, non-listed) company the peer
group’s beta βl,p first has to be adjusted for its leverage Lp by using equation (1). The
relevant tax rate is now that rate which is imposed on the peer group company, τp. By








In a second step βu has to be relevered according to the leverage level of the company









Inserting (2) in (3) und rearranging finally yields in
βl,c = βl,p
1 + rf + Lc(1 + rf (1− τc))
1 + rf + Lp(1 + rf (1− τp)) . (4)
With the aid of this equation one can control not only for differing financial risks but
also for divergent tax rates in context of adjusting beta. Whenever tax rates as well as debt
ratios coincide equation (4) makes obvious that βl,c equals βl,p and no further adjustments
are necessary. However, since this will rarely occur in practice we want to analyze the
effects of a disregard of divergent tax rates in the following numerical analysis.
3 Numerical Analysis
In this section we perform a numerical analysis to measure the errors that occur when
tax effects are neglected and a unique tax rate is applied instead. In the following, the
parameter values taking into consideration re- and untaxing will be denoted as true values.
They abstain from the simplifying assumption of unique tax rates. The following figures
show the differences between these true values and those values assuming an equal tax rate
amounting to τc, even though τp might be different. In this manner we show the extent of
a possible distortion caused by disregarding tax differences.
The initial values of the numerical analysis are set as follows.
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• The leverage ratio of the peer group (Lp) equals the leverage ratio of the company
being valued (Lc), both amounting to Lp = Lc = 9. The equality of these values is
necessary for separating the tax effects from financing effects.8
• In order to determine the firm value we assume a constant free cash flow E(F˜CF ) = 1
in form of a perpetual annuity. This assumption is appropriate because we take into
account relative variations only. Furthermore, in an second step, the effects of positive
growth rates g will be analyzed.
• Beta of the peer group is set to βl,p = 3. The risk-free interest rate amounts to
rf = 10 % and the market risk premium to MRP = 8 %.
• The tax rate of the company being valued (τc) and the tax rate of the peer group
(τp) are of particular interest for the following analyzes and will be varied.
The distortion caused by the simplifying assumption of unique tax rates impacts relevant
parameters of the valuation. However, it may affect the relevant parameters in a different
extent and in a different direction. Therefore, the following figures show the distortions
regarding the company’s beta βl,c, its costs of equity kl,c as well as the weighted average
costs of capital WACCc and the firm value V l,c separately.
While the formula for beta was derived in the previous section (see equation (4)) the other
parameters can be derived as follows. According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model costs
of equity capital can be written as
kl,c = rf +MRP · βl,c (5)
while the weighted average costs of capital results from
WACCc = kl,c · 1
1 + Lc
+ rf (1− τc) · Lc
1 + Lc
. (6)
For the company’s market value on the basis of a perpetuity
V l,c =
E(F˜CF )
WACCc − g (7)
is applied. These parameters are of particular interest for every corporate valuation and
will thus be considered in the following numerical analysis.
8We take a given debt policy for granted and we will not discuss the question of which leverage ratio
maximizes the value of the levered company.
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First, we focus on the impact of tax rate differentials. We assume a tax rate of the
company being valued amounting to τc=50 % and vary the peer group’s tax rate on an
interval between 0 % to 100 % on the x-coordinate. This assumptions allows us to show a
tax rate difference in a wide rage between -50 %, to +50 %.





















Figure 1 shows relevant distortions caused by a disregard of un- and retaxing depending
on tax rate differences. A positive value means that the true value is higher than the
simplified value. With increasing tax rate differences and τp > τc beta, equity costs of
capital as well as WACC are underestimated. For τp < τc we find a contrary effect. Based
on these distortions an over-/underestimation of the firm value results.
In a second step we show the impact of leverage on the valuation errors caused by the
assumption of unique tax rates. In this case, we assume a constant tax rate difference of
50 % with τp < τc. Furthermore, we vary the leverage ratio of the peer group company (Lp)
on an interval between 0 to 9. The leverage ratio of the company being valued is constant
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and set to Lc = 4.5. In this manner we get results for positive and negative deviations.



















Figure 2 shows overestimation on the whole interval for beta, WACC and the costs of
equity. In contrast, firm value is underestimated by neglecting re- and untaxing effects.
Furthermore, the figure makes obvious that WACC as well as the equity costs of capital
are not a monotonous decreasing function in leverage difference. For a peer group leverage
ratio of 2.27 (3.78) we find a minimum for WACC (equity costs). As expected, the firm
value function has a maximum analogous to the WACC minimum. The explanation for
these extreme value is based on the opposing effects between un- and relevering on the
one hand and un- and retaxing on the other hand. In the zero origin there is no difference
between the parameters because the peer group did not raise any debt and leverage ratio
is zero. This leads to equity costs of capital and beta of an unlevered firm which makes
unlevering and relevering redundant. Raising leverage Lp increases the unlevering effect
which is additionally strengthened by the untaxing effect. When continuing the increase
of leverage ratio, the relative tax rate effect decreases because of the peer group’s leverage
Prof. Dr.Daniela Lorenz, Dr. Christian Sielaff, Int. J. Eco. Res., 2012v3i5, 92-100 ISSN: 2229-6158
IJER | Sep - Oct 2012  
Available online@www.ijeronline.com
 97
International Journal of Economics and Research, 2012v3i5, 92–100 ISSN: 2229-6158
ratio effect. See equation (2) for this contrary effects. These opposite effects are causal for
the minimum (maximum) values of the functions. Figure 2 shows that distortions for the
firm value amount to approximately 2 % when an exemplary tax rate difference of 50 % is
applied.
The assumption of constant free cash flows is not very realistic. For that reason we take
into account positive growth rates in a last step and show how they affect the extent of
our results concerning firm value. For the numerical analysis we again assume a tax rate
difference of 50 % with τp < τc. The peer group leverage ratio is set to its above calculated
maximum value of Lp = 2.27, while Lc amounts to 9. We vary the growth rate in figure 3
on an interval between 0 % and 8 %.













In this case, the true firm value is higher than the simplified value. This distortion
increases with growth in cash flows. For example, a growth rate of 8 % leads to a higher
true firm value of 5.05 %9 This simple numerical analysis shows that the disregard of
9For a tax rate difference of 50 % and the assumption that τp > τc, we find an overestimation in absence
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untaxing and retaxing leads to relevant mispricings in corporate valuation. Particularly,
the extent of the distortions depends on differences in the actual tax rate and leverage
ratios as well as on the growth of cash flows.
4 Conclusion
The problem of untaxing and retaxing arises whenever a peer group company is chosen
that underlies a tax regime that differs from the regime being relevant for the company
that is to be valued. Due to high tax differentials between but also within countries that
problem is likely to occur and makes an adjustment of the peer group beta for divergent
financial risk and for differing tax regimes inevitable. Insofar it is surprising that divergent
corporate tax rates in the standard procedure of unlevering and relevering beta have not
been addressed in literature before, implying the unrealistic assumption of an unique tax
rate being relevant.
This article provides evidence that significant mispricings can occur when companies are
valued based on peer group betas that are not adjusted for divergent tax rates. Conse-
quently, such a disregard of tax effects can distort investors’ decision making. In particular,
we show that for relatively high tax rates of the peer group company (τc < τp) beta, the
cost of equity as well as the weighted costs of capital are underestimated, whereas com-
paratively low tax rates (τc > τp) lead to an overestimation of these parameters. This
in turn results in incorrect firm values of substantial extent depending on the underlying
parameter values. Moreover, the numerical analysis demonstrates amplifying effects: The
difference between the company’s and peer group’s debt ratios as well as the growth rate of
future cash flows reinforces the extent of the distortions caused by a disregard of untaxing
and retaxing. Particularly with regard to strongly growing environments with high growth
rates the valuation error is substantial and reaches up to 5 % based on the numbers of our
numerical example.
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